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Abstract
Critical Theory pioneered the theorization of human-animal relations, helping establish that 
agency extends beyond the human world. Nonhuman agency is now widely accepted within 
the “new materialisms” and beyond but there are growing calls for more critical approaches 
that consider why and how such agency is mobilized. These calls effectively bring together the 
concerns of “old” and “new” materialisms. I therefore return to Critical Theory, bringing its 
explanatory analysis, practical framework and future imaginary into conversation with more 
recent research into nonhuman agency. Together, they reveal how the relations between 
human and nonhuman actors shape and are shaped by their broader socio-political context. I 
suggest that paying closer attention to human-domestic animal relations in particular might help 
us resolve some of the issues at stake. Consequently, for illustrations to extend the analysis, 
the article turns to horses, a nonhuman group who occupy a unique place in our collective 
unconscious.
Keywords
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Introduction
Long before the contemporary “animal turn,” Critical Theory had begun to theorize industrial 
society’s troubling relationship with its nonhuman members (Gunderson 2014). The Frankfurt 
theorists—particularly Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno—were the first to highlight how 
parallel and intertwined social processes effectively marginalize both animals and specific groups 
of people such as women, ethnic minorities, and workers. Similarly, both the first and second 
generation of Critical Theorists acknowledged the agency and subjectivity of nonhuman animals 
(Gunderson 2014, 2017). These ideas have been somewhat neglected by contemporary human-
animal scholars, for reasons explained below. Nonetheless, this dual focus—on power relations 
and nonhuman agency—renders Critical Theory of potential relevance not only to human-animal 
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relations but also to wider contemporary debates about “new materialisms.” The present article 
therefore builds on Ryan Gunderson’s analysis by exploring how the Frankfurt School’s theoriza-
tion of the animal question might in turn contribute to a more critical understanding of how other 
nonhuman entities also act in meaningful ways.
Growing recognition and acknowledgment of multiple more-than-human agencies challenges 
us to extend our thinking to “beings, things, and objects previously ignored as active agents” 
(Dowling, Lloyd, and Suchet-Pearson 2017: 824). Research into these “new materialisms” is 
philosophically and methodologically diverse, but shares a common recognition that agency is 
not limited to human beings. Bruno Latour’s (2007) Actor Network Theory (ANT) is particularly 
influential, but researchers also draw on the work of Karen Barad (2007), Karen Cerulo (2009, 
2011), Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010), Tim Ingold (2008), and Sarah Whatmore (2002) 
among others. ANT came out of Science and Technology Studies in the early 1980s, promising a 
way to rethink the social world and the place of people, animals, and other actors within it. Rather 
than a theory, ANT is an epistemological position that “offers a novel view both of social interac-
tion and of those who can legitimately participate in it” (Cerulo 2009:534). In common with the 
other approaches mentioned above, ANT stresses that “the social” does not exist prior to interac-
tion, but rather emerges through interactions between diverse “actants” including humans, ani-
mals, objects, ideas, and technology. It is therefore of particular relevance and usefulness to those 
whose focus lies beyond the human world as it denies any “a priori ontological assumption of 
human superiority” (Taylor 2011:212). The alternative accounts of agency and ontology that this 
kind of approach engenders effectively promise to alter our categories and concepts fundamen-
tally. In shifting our attention from individual actors and entities to the relationships between 
them, they allow us to explore how everything from politicians to mice to fungi play an active 
and meaningful role in the making of our world. Inherently political in reach, then, these new 
materialisms can help us question both the politics of nature (Latour 2004) and the politics of 
culture (Latimer and Birke 2009).
Martin Arboleda (2017) suggests the underlying premise of new materialisms is now self-
evident and he urges us to move from tautologous accounts of nonhuman agency toward more 
critical approaches. Thomas Lemke (2018) makes a similar observation:
It is not sufficient to celebrate the move from dead and passive to vibrant and active matter; we need 
an analysis of how matter is differentially mobilized and to what ends. (P. 45)
The present paper responds to this call by exploring how Critical Theory’s analysis of human-
animal relations contributes to these contemporary discussions about other more-than-human 
agencies. Specifically, I examine how one particular group of nonhuman actors—horses—
engages with others and how their agency intersects with wider relations of place and power. 
That is, I aim to bring together “old” and “new” materialisms in a way that might usefully add to 
our understanding of both.
A more critical approach to new materialisms requires that we acknowledge agency not as a 
property of individual entities, but as an affective relationship between them (Despret 2013a; 
Devellennes and Dillet 2018; Lemke 2018). Evidence of the interconnectedness and inseparabil-
ity of diverse forms of life abound (Hovorka 2019). For example, Owain Jones (2014) draws our 
attention to trees, noting how their relationships of affective exchange with other agents like 
people and technology render them “lead players” in the city and beyond. Through these co-
constructed relations, trees become specific active makers of place, often defying, exploiting, or 
benefiting from human schemes. Similarly, Anna Tsing (2015) focuses on how the global trade 
in matsutake mushrooms is underpinned by “patterns of unintentional coordination” between 
multiple actors (p. 23). The mushrooms attach themselves to the roots of pine trees in particular. 
They grow in abundance in forests that have been disturbed by human activity, enabling forests 
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to flourish in otherwise damaged places. The mushrooms command astronomical prices in Japan, 
where industrial expansion—together with an invasion of nematodes—has decimated the pine 
forests and their accompanying matsutake colonies. The mushrooms are now increasingly har-
vested across China, Europe, and North America instead. For Tsing, this tale of multispecies 
cohabitation demonstrates the possibility of collaborative survival in a time of massive human 
destruction.
This shift away from those doing the relating (i.e. the human subject who has the capacity to 
act intentionally) toward the relational webs and practices that connect human and other actors 
has been enthusiastically embraced by many scholars in the field of human animal studies in 
particular (Wilkie 2015). Kenneth Shapiro and Margo DeMello’s (2010) insightful overview of 
that field explain why this might be so. Human animal studies originated in philosophy, which 
was concerned with questions about why and how we value animals (e.g. Regan 1983; Singer 
1975). This gradually gave way to more empirical research. That is, across other disciplines—
including geography, anthropology, and sociology—scholars began to explore how adding ani-
mals into the analysis might extend our understanding of concepts like alienation (Benton 1998) 
and violence (Cudworth 2015). New materialist approaches, in turn, allow us to further explore 
the seam between such concepts and the wider relationships on which they rest (Shapiro and 
DeMello 2010).
For example, in their study of dairy cows and milking technologies, Lewis Holloway and 
Christopher Bear (2017) explore how emergent technologies are shaped by the agency and sub-
jectivity of cows and people alike. Focusing on the cow’s perspective, Holloway and Bear sug-
gest that the technology shapes what they can do and what they experience. But this is also 
affected by the people who program and operate the machines, and the cows themselves. The 
consequences for cows are benign but also problematic. Cows gain freedom and choice about 
when they are milked, but they are more easily disciplined in new technologically mediated 
ways. Similarly, Jocelyne Porcher and Tiphaine Schmitt (2012) suggest that under such condi-
tions, cows do more than function. Rather they invest their intelligence and affects in their work. 
That is, they respect the rules laid down by the farmer but also have autonomous behaviors. 
They avoid conflicts, negotiate, and are polite and conciliatory with others. Lindsay Hamilton 
and Laura Mitchell trace similar processes in their study of Herdwick sheep and shepherds in 
the U.K. Lake District. They find that sheep, humans, and dogs are embedded in a complex web 
of relations, markets, and terrains. By focusing on the agency of the animal as well as human 
members of this particular story, we are able to develop a more sophisticated understanding of 
what work is and how it creates value. Imbued with ethical, political, and social considerations, 
this valuation far exceeds a discussion of who controls the means and ends of the labor process: 
Rather, it takes us into the very politics of species membership (Hamilton and Mitchell 2018).
Vinciane Despret (2013a) notes that we tend to notice animal agency only when it manifests 
as resistance. Similarly, Fudge (2017) suggests we dismiss animals’ cooperation as mindless. To 
do otherwise is profoundly unsettling, as it challenges our assumptions about what we might 
expect of them and ourselves since there can be no agency that is not shared with others. Alongside 
practical improvements, then, Fudge says we need to engage in a process of “re-enchantment,” 
through which we will recognize that the experiences of cows (and indeed horses and other ani-
mals) can be as varied and interesting as our own.
So far, we have briefly considered the agency of trees, fungi. and farm animals. However, our 
entangled relationships with domestic animals are perhaps especially revealing. That is, their 
shared evolution with humans means they help make us who we are (Haraway 2008). Cats settled 
near Neolithic human villages and their accompanying rodent populations, while dogs have pro-
vided security and companionship throughout the ages. Horses, in particular, hold a unique place 
in our collective unconscious. The act of riding opens up distinctive forms of interspecies com-
munication and partnership, enabling humans and horses to connect physically and share spatial, 
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geographical, and emotional trajectories (Dashper 2016; Game 2001; Thompson 2011). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that horses have “inspired the arts, revolutionized warfare, shaped 
societies, and conquered continents” (Notzke 2013:402). Our long and intimate association in 
turn “reveals and illuminates important and symbolic societal transformations” that have unfolded 
within industrial society and affect both horses and humans (Adelman and Thompson 2017:3). 
With their overlapping micro and macro significance, then, horse-human relations are especially 
useful in developing a more critical understanding of the human and nonhuman agencies that 
underpin the new materialisms.
So let us return now to Critical Theory. As outlined above, the Frankfurt theorists were the 
first to highlight the embeddedness of animals within the larger institutional framework of indus-
trial society (Driessen 2014; Gunderson 2014). In so doing, they drew attention to the overlap 
between the exploitation of humans and the domination of other animals. Critical Theory thus 
offers useful insight into the relationships underpinning human and nonhuman agency, and how 
these are created and constrained within wider structures of power.
As Ryan Gunderson’s (2014) work makes clear, the diverse theories that emerged from the 
Frankfurt School are linked by their explanatory, practical, and normative ambitions. That is, 
they explain what is wrong with current social reality, distinguish the actors and forces involved, 
and identify achievable practical goals for social transformation (Bohman 2016). Critical Theory 
therefore helps new materialisms take animals seriously in three ways. First, it reveals how ani-
mals (and people) are engaged within hierarchical relations and the implications of this for indi-
vidual animals or animal groups. That is, Critical Theory enables us to understand the 
marginalization of domestic animals in rich countries like the U.K. and its wider significance. 
Second, Critical Theory provides a practical framework through which we might begin to chal-
lenge the marginalization of particular individuals or groups of nonhuman actors. Third, the 
normative ambitions of Critical Theory promise a new political imaginary that can advance the 
idea of this broader, more inclusive moral community.
Given the above, it may seem surprising that Critical Theory has not featured more prominently 
in sociological debates about the status and agency of animals (and other nonhumans). Gunderson’s 
work (cited throughout this paper) is of course a notable exception (see also Driessen 2014; Meijer 
2013, 2017; Whitworth 2000). In part, this may be a straightforward issue of its unpalatability. 
Critics suggest Critical Theory comprises a “most unhappy literature full of third-person passive 
voices holding forth with ‘Big Thoughts’ on ‘Big Issues’” (Putnam et al. 1993:229). However, the 
absence of Critical Theory within human-animal research is also understandable in philosophical 
terms. At the heart of the microsociological tradition, particularly in the United States, is a focus 
on social interaction (Cerulo 2009). Traditionally, this was assumed to depend on capabilities pos-
sessed only by humans, such as intention, self-identity, and—perhaps most significantly for the 
present paper—communication via language. Cerulo (2009) notes that new materialisms have 
been decisive in bringing nonhumans into social interaction, via their emphasis on “action” over 
“mind.” As a result, many scholars are now carving out a more central role for animals and other 
nonhumans in their analyses. But in so doing, they have not (yet) turned to Critical Theory, not 
least because—as discussed later—the “communicative turn” within the Frankfurt tradition firmly 
excluded animals from the analysis and has not yet allowed them back in.
The present article therefore suggests that animals are useful in two ways. First, they bring 
theoretical insight into an increasingly mainstream concern—namely the material and problem-
atic relationships between the human and nonhuman. Second, and perhaps just as importantly, 
they also promise a reassuring tangibility, an appealing element of slapstick and anarchy 
(Mathews 2007; Swart 2007). A secondary aim of this article, then, is to join efforts to rehabili-
tate Critical Theory among a wider audience. Taking it out into the field, literally, we encounter 
a variety of equine actors and their human companions: Valuable and much-loved competition 
horses who live a privileged but lonely life; a grumpy mare who keeps her younger fieldmates on 
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the straight and narrow; and the legendary Clever Hans with his apparent aptitude for arithmetic. 
Academic analysis often overlooks or devalues domestic animals and our relations with them 
(Kheel 2008; Swart 2007). However, as Jurgen Habermas (1993) himself points out, their prob-
lematic status is especially helpful in discussing human-nonhuman agencies: “We communicate 
with animals in a different way once we involve them in our social interactions, in however 
asymmetrical a fashion” (p. 106). Thus, while drawing our attention to individual beings and 
their concerns, horses and other domestic animals enable us to understand the larger socio-eco-
nomic context.
While the paper is largely theoretical in nature, then, several examples of horse-human rela-
tionships illustrate and extend the analysis. Some of these stories are drawn from existing research 
(e.g. Despret 2004; Schuurman and Franklin 2015; Zetterqvist and Lundgren 2017). Others come 
from my own fieldwork within post-productive rural communities in the north of England. This 
focuses on how particular groups of people and horses experience and sometimes resist their 
relocation from the center of relations of production to the margins of consumption and leisure. 
This wider project can be understood as an extended case study, in that it aims to examine macro-
level questions through their everyday manifestations on the ground (Burawoy 1998). It also 
heeds Kendra Coulter’s (2018) call for more animal-centric research approaches. That is, I rec-
ognize people and horses alike as subjects, objects, and agents in their own stories (Hribal 2007; 
Swart 2007). Still ongoing, fieldwork effectively “follows the horses,” to use Christoph Lange’s 
(2018) expression. Ethnographic data are drawn from historical and contemporary documents, as 
well as interviews with people who share their lives with horses, as riders, breeders, or business 
owners. Participant observation—at stables, equestrian competitions, horse auctions, and else-
where—focuses on human and equine participants alike. The tales told here came up when visit-
ing participants’ yards, at organized gatherings of local riders, or beside the ever-popular water 
jump at a cross-country event. Other stories were experienced more directly: I watch, listen, and 
join in as people and horses wait anxiously for the vet to arrive or share an exhilarating gallop 
across a recently harvested field. In bringing Critical Theory to bear on this particular ethno-
graphic material, then, my wider research served as a starting point for both theoretical insights 
and practical illustrations for the present paper.
In summary, this article responds both to Gunderson’s (2014) invitation to take the animal 
question seriously and to wider calls to adopt a more critical approach to human-nonhuman agency 
(e.g. Arboleda 2017; Lemke 2018). Specifically, it explores how the relations between one particu-
lar subset of human and nonhuman actors are embedded within their broader socio-political con-
text. As such, it aims to bring together “old” and “new” materialisms, discussing each in turn 
before considering how paying closer attention to human-domestic animal relations in particular 
might help resolve some of the issues at stake. Hilary Rose (1998) suggests these relations lie at 
the very epicenter of industrial society’s concerns about animals. It is therefore not an esoteric 
preoccupation to bring them fully and theoretically into our social analysis in this way, but a neces-
sary and mainstream endeavor (Gunderson 2014; Stuart, Schewe, and Gunderson 2013). The 
article is structured as follows. First, drawing explicitly on Gunderson (2014), I set out how the 
early Critical Theorists (i.e. Horkheimer and Adorno) provide an explanatory analysis of animal 
oppression. I then show how new materialisms help reconcile animals more fully into their analy-
sis. A focus on domestic animals in particular emphasizes how nonhumans can be political as well 
as social actors, thereby introducing the possibility of challenging that oppression. Second, I dis-
cuss how Critical Theory offers a practical framework for analysis, specifically via Habermas’ 
ideas about communication as a source of mutual understanding and change. I then explore how 
new materialisms usefully complement these ideas by extending them to nonhumans. A focus on 
domestic animals in particular enables us to reflect on how we might more effectively listen to 
what nonhumans are “telling” us. Finally, the different strands of Critical Theory—together with 
recent new materialist scholarship—promise an alternative normative imaginary and an 
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accompanying transformation in human-animal relationships. The article suggests that while 
inequalities of power may be inescapable, they are not necessarily fatal to our relations with horses 
and other animals. 
Overlapping Forms of Domination: How Critical Theory Explains 
the Oppression of Domestic Animals
The early Critical Theorists place human-animal relationships at the heart of their analysis of 
industrial society (Gunderson 2014). They viewed the distinction between human and animal as 
conceptually foundational to Western, post-Enlightenment thought:
The idea of man [sic] in European history is expressed in the way in which he is distinguished from 
the animal. Animal irrationality is adduced as proof of human dignity. (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1969:245)
This distinction predates the Industrial Revolution, going back to the Ancient Greeks and beyond 
(Plumwood 1993). In modern society, however, it culminates in a brutality against animals that 
is unprecedented in its scale and ubiquity (Adorno 1974; Horkheimer and Adorno 1969). 
Continued technical and economic progress depends upon the ever more efficient harnessing of 
nature (Adorno 1974). People seek to learn from nature and its inhabitants only that which will 
enable them to continue to dominate both the “natural world” and other people (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1969). Under capitalism, then, an instrumental approach to “irrational” animals para-
doxically enslaves humans too (Gunderson 2014). The early Critical Theorists thereby high-
lighted that the distinction between humans and animals has had very real material consequences 
for both. In so doing, they effectively anticipated a fundamental tenet of critical animal studies 
many decades later, namely that “the fight for the animal . . . is a fight for man” (Horkheimer 
2007:228; see also Gunderson 2014).
Within Critical Theory, the “dialectic” between human and nonhuman replaces class struggle 
as the key to understanding industrial society:
The problem with society lay not merely with its relations of production [as asserted by Marx] but its 
entire foundation on the “rationalizing” premises of the Enlightenment, the appliance of principles of 
reason and scientific method . . . Both “inner” (human) nature and “outer” (non-human) nature were 
subordinate to these principles. (Whitworth 2000:146)
Any potential solution therefore requires some kind of reconciliation with nature and its nonhu-
man inhabitants. However, the pernicious and persistent presence of instrumental reason across 
every corner of modern society leads Horkheimer and Adorno to suggest that such a reconcilia-
tion is impossible (Whitworth 2000).
In summary, the discussion so far suggests that Critical Theory pioneered the theorizing of 
human-animal relationships. While linking the domination of animals in industrial society to our 
own, however, it was pessimistic about the possibility of overcoming the rationalizing premises 
that estranged humans from these nonhuman “others.” Animals were therefore effectively rele-
gated to the theoretical margins, before being sidelined altogether by the “second generation,” as 
discussed later. This helps explain the lack of engagement to date of new materialists and human-
animal scholars with their Frankfurt forebears. We now discuss how such an integration might 
strengthen Critical Theory’s analysis, adding also to our understanding of human and nonhuman 
agency.
Focusing expressly on nonhuman others, and the worlds they share with humans, the useful-
ness of new materialisms to this analysis is immediately clear. Research sites comprise 
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interactions between myriad human and nonhuman actors, embedded in turn within broader 
socio-political networks. All actors—human and nonhuman—are active entities, worthy of con-
sideration: They “matter” precisely because of their relationships with others (Latour 2007; see 
also Barad 2007; Cerulo 2011; Ingold 2008; Law and Mol 2002; Whatmore 2002). Such “relat-
ings” can take the form of everything from a polite introduction between “two quasi-individuated 
beings” to complex patterns “more reminiscent of a cat’s cradle” (Haraway 2008:41). According 
to this view, the individual actor cannot be the point of origin but “can only share in the action, 
distribute it with other actants” (Latour 1996:237). For any actor to act, others must act as well. 
Or as Barad (2007) suggests, agency is not something that someone or something has, but is “a 
matter of intra-acting” (p. 178). Thus, human and nonhuman participants alike enroll each other 
into an ongoing program of action that leads toward a specific outcome. For example, the discov-
ery of pasteurization is reinterpreted as a joint enterprise of rats, bacteria, industrialists, and 
worms among others (Latour 1988). In the context of human-animal relations, Taylor (2011) 
suggests this emphasis on the relations between actors rather than the actors themselves is useful 
in two ways. First, it takes us away from perennial arguments about who (or what) is conceived 
as an actor. Rather, animals, people, and inanimate objects alike are co-constitutive in those rela-
tionships. Second, then, “it is an approach which sees all perspectives as equal—as tied together 
in networks” (Taylor 2011:210). That is, by focusing on the performative and emergent nature of 
these relationships, new materialisms overcome our analytical anthropocentrism by creating the 
possibility of a level playing field for all things human and nonhuman.
The extent of humanity’s co-evolution with domestic animals renders those relations espe-
cially revealing. Humans and horses, for example, mutually construct their relations with each 
other. Lynda Birke and Kirrilly Thompson (2017) align with Thomas Lemke (2018) and Donna 
Haraway (2008), in suggesting horses are not agents or actors simply by virtue of “being there” 
in (our) networks. That is, agency is not a given but is the outcome of relations with multiple 
others enacted through numerous roles (Hobson 2007). Interspecies relations are thereby simul-
taneously structural and personal: “When we encounter a horse, we meet someone [with] their 
own experiences of life, their own expectations, their own subjectivity” (Birke and Thompson 
2017:44). As a specific individual and a class of such individuals, animals hold species qualities 
that predispose them to a particular way of being or behaving, but this is also influenced by the 
agency of the individual animal (Haraway 2008). For example, horses are herd animals primed 
for threat (Birke and Thompson 2017). When Rosa, the herd leader, is separated from her field-
mates, she stands quiet but alert, watching the horizon until they come home safe. By contrast, 
her diminutive friend Bea is more likely to canter round hollering indignantly. Youngster Breeze 
is no longer left alone since she took to hurdling the fence, much to the delight of the elderly 
Welsh pony next door. Marti Kheel (2008) suggests focusing on domestic animals like horses in 
this way enables us to place individual beings—and our feelings of care and empathy for them—
within their larger historical and contemporary context. More widely, Lemke (2018) suggests 
that this reappraisal of matter is intrinsically connected to a rethinking of the composition of the 
political collective, and the question of how nonhumans shape and govern political practices and 
social conduct. He adds that a radical “new” politics requires that we move beyond seeing agency 
as a property of individual entities, since this will inevitably give undue credit to humans rather 
than nonhumans. Like Despret (2013a) above, he instead advocates a relational approach, 
through which we can understand how these different materialities work in concert.
If we focus, by contrast, on what Lemke (2018) calls their “modes of doing,” it becomes clearer 
how horses’ individual agency and generic collective qualities are embedded within wider relations 
of space and place. At a nearby competition venue, valuable showjumpers are kept individually in 
neat, rectangular paddocks. Owner Jane says, “I wouldn’t have it any other way! I’d never have 
Otto in a herd situation, it’s just too much risk.” Otto and his neighbors are protected from acciden-
tal injury, but they are also unable to groom each other or take turns to watch out for long-vanished 
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predators. This set-up is too much for others. Minnie’s behavior became so erratic—crashing 
through fences, rearing under saddle—that her owner feared she had developed a brain tumor. The 
symptoms disappeared when she moved to a yard where everyone lived in one big group. As sug-
gested by Despret (2013a) above, Minnie’s agency only became visible when she was driven to 
resist her confined living arrangements. They might not communicate their wishes as directly as 
Minnie, but perhaps we should also “wonder about” Minnie’s erstwhile neighbors (Fudge 2017). 
They too might prefer to take their chances with a clumsy companion or two, but this option is not 
open to them because of their economic and/or emotional value to their human owners.
As individuals and classes of individuals, then, horses like Minnie and Otto are embedded 
within wider human and nonhuman relations. Birke and Thompson (2017) suggest this means we 
need to think in terms of accountability, or “what’s in it for the horse?” (p. 138). That is, in pursu-
ing interspecies engagement, we should also question, “is it enough that the horse can ask, only 
to be told no? (Birke and Thompson 2017:139). Kennan Ferguson (2004) suggests this is an 
important question for people too, as it potentially challenges the presuppositions and causalities 
that underpin our human-centric theories. Rather, in order to be useful, any theory must recognize 
and accept important human affinities with domestic animals in particular. Otherwise—Ferguson 
says—it will fail empirically and ideologically. Combining Critical Theory with new materialist 
approaches takes us closer, but we need an additional step in order to achieve the radical “new” 
politics sought by Lemke and others. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s (2011) “zoopolis” is 
helpful here. While they do not reference materialisms old or new, they suggest similarly that a 
narrowly defined focus on rationality has marginalized particular groups (both animal and 
human). However, unlike the Critical Theorists, they are able to overcome the difficulties of 
contemplating the potential emancipation of animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka use the concept 
of dependent agency to suggest that individuals who cannot speak will make their views known 
in other ways to those who are willing to listen. This in turn allows us to see historically subordi-
nated animals (and people) as subjective individuals rather than objective groups, who can par-
ticipate in shaping and sustaining larger cooperative schemes. That is, we both acknowledge their 
“relational agency” and render them visible (Despret 2013a). Specifically, the very process of 
domestication presupposes and reinforces three key criteria that underpin political interaction. 
For just one example of how horses meet these criteria, we can visit Minnie at her new home, a 
typical “do-it-yourself” livery yard. At fetching-in time, the herd express their subjective good—
their desire to trade a waterlogged field for a dry stable and a full haynet—each time they drift 
toward the gateway come mid-afternoon. They also illustrate how participants comply with social 
norms. As a scrum ensues, Minnie flattens her ears momentarily and the jostling youngsters 
alongside grudgingly allow her to step forward first. Finally, these same horses are constantly 
shaping the terms of their interactions with the human and nonhuman members of their group. 
Last to clatter into his stable, Minnie’s neighbor Freddy immediately flops onto the shavings, 
flailing his legs and scattering the immaculate bed in all directions. His new owner laughs at his 
apparent exuberance. Her instructor proffers a less palatable explanation, suggesting that Freddy 
has developed an effective and potentially dangerous method of ejecting her from his personal 
space: Either way Freddy is clearly exerting his control over events.
In summary, new materialist perspectives illustrate the active role of domestic animals in 
shaping our common world(s). By drawing on Critical Theory and more recent political theory, 
we can place these efforts within a wider context. This suggests we can extend concepts like 
agency and citizenship to animals, but also that we have a moral and political duty to do so. This 
enriches rather than undermines the concepts in question (Birke and Thompson 2017; Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2011; Ferguson 2004). It also requires new forms of representation and institutions 
(Meijer 2013). This is where we can usefully return to the ideas of the Frankfurt School, namely 
the “second generation” and its focus on communication and deliberation. If we can find a way 
Wadham 117
to listen to and act upon—in practice—what domestic animals are telling us, then we might 
enable Lemke’s (2018) “new” forms of politics to emerge after all.
Emancipation through Communication: How Critical 
Theory Provides a Practical Framework to Challenge the 
Marginalization of Domestic Animals
For the early Critical Theorists, the assumption that humankind is radically different from other 
animals was fundamental to the process of Enlightenment rationalization and is therefore theoreti-
cally insurmountable. By contrast, the “second generation” suggests this rationalizing process has 
not gone far enough. According to its leading figure, Jurgen Habermas (1981, 1987), further 
enlightenment—in the form of “communicative action”—is the only way to overcome the alien-
ation that separates us from each other and from nonhuman nature. In contrast to “strategic action” 
aimed at influencing specific outcomes, communicative action enables participants to build their 
mutual understanding of the issues they face through rational dialogue. Two features are of par-
ticular interest here. First, drawing on the work of Herbert Mead, communicative action assumes 
a paradigmatic shift from the atomistic self of Cartesian consciousness to an ego that retains an 
“intersubjective core” that emerges from our interactions with others. The result is a focus on the 
process and results of communication between subjects, rather than the subjects themselves. This 
points us toward the second aspect of interest, namely that communicative action is a messy, 
socially embedded encounter that—crucially—transforms participants on both sides. Who we are 
is subject to constant reformulation as the identity of the individual and that of the collective are 
interdependent, forming and maintaining themselves together (Habermas 1987).
Communicative action facilitates a more emancipated society in which survival increasingly 
depends on social cooperation rather than technical control (Moss and Pavesich 2011). It might 
therefore provide a practical framework through which to challenge the marginalization of 
domestic animals and facilitate a “new” form of politics. Indeed, Jurgen Habermas (1982) spe-
cifically highlights that this emancipated society should adopt a more enlightened approach to its 
animal inhabitants by effectively extending our neighborly circle beyond the human. However, 
he simultaneously denies nonhumans a more active role in that society, when he suggests that 
“what raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language” (Habermas 
1972:314). Since animals cannot grasp the basic structures and fundamental rules of language, 
“we cannot come to an understanding [with them] about something in the world” (Habermas 
1993:109). Habermas’ narrow focus on language thereby relegates to the theoretical sidelines 
anyone who cannot talk. However, the equine participants we have met so far are reluctant to 
remain on the bench. For a start, horses draw on a vast range of vocalizations that sound very 
much like language even to an untrained human ear: They whicker when dinner arrives; neigh 
when a familiar car pulls up; and call out anxiously when separated. It would be faintly absurd to 
suggest that these examples of equine speech embody the grammatical structures and appeals to 
validity that Habermas had in mind. Nonetheless, it is perhaps equally peculiar to hold fast to 
such a limited definition of language. For example, in partnership with their riders, the “dancing” 
dressage horses at the Olympic Games perform complicated physical feats based on completely 
silent and largely imperceptible communicative acts (Zetterqvist and Lundgren 2017). A focus on 
(human) language risks overlooking this “vast repertoire of gestures, movements and signals” 
that horses and other domestic animals rely on to tell us—and each other—how they feel, what 
they are about to do, and what they want (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011:109). By simply extend-
ing Habermas’ framework to animals, we risk creating a hierarchy that overlooks these less obvi-
ous forms of communication (Driessen 2014). Indeed, Habermas (1993) himself changes his 
mind, later observing that when animals “participate in our interactions . . . it is of the same kind 
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as an intersubjective relation” and we should therefore not just communicate about animals but 
with them (p. 110).
Eva Meijer (2013) suggests that “seeing animals as mute does not simply reflect a misunder-
standing of their capacities: It is interconnected with the way humans have defined language and 
politics and has led to rendering animals silent as a political group” (p. 28). As Fudge (2017) says 
above, shifting that understanding represents a fundamental challenge to our understanding of 
human and nonhuman animals alike. This is a challenge that Habermas appears to acknowledge 
in his later work, when he goes some way to expanding his analysis beyond the human world and 
acknowledges animals as social and moral actors (Habermas 1993). John Dryzek (1985) prefig-
ures this move, as well as that of new materialisms, in suggesting that it is indeed possible to 
extend rationality to nonhumans:
This recognition of agency in nature means that we should treat signals emanating from the natural 
world with the same respect we accord signals emanating from human subjects, and as requiring 
equally careful interpretation . . . Thus communicative interaction with the natural world can and 
should be an eminently rational affair. (P. 20)
According to Dryzek, we need to dismantle the barriers that may inhibit such rational, interspe-
cies engagement. Robyn Eckersley (1990) is more explicit about what should be done: “The fact 
that the nonhuman world cannot participate in human speech should be no barrier to their special 
interests always being considered and respected by those who can participate in the dialogue” 
(p. 761). One possible route is representing animals and their interests via human advocates. For 
example, in their work on wild boars, Erica Von Essen and Michael Allen (2016) suggest human 
proxies might “approximate and extrapolate from [the boars’] perspectives in order to determine 
and promote their best interests when making contestations of current policy on their behalf” 
(p. 74). Advocacy on behalf of animals is certainly a useful approach. However, speaking and 
acting “on behalf of” animals inevitably means political engagement at one remove. Even if we 
overcome our theoretical reservations to a more direct approach, the practical difficulties of 
bringing animals “into the room” will remain. An alternative is to think, conversely, how “we” 
might go out into the field:
Instead of only occurring as part of institutionalized and formalized settings, more mundane and non-
discursive forms of deliberation can be part of material political processes too, at least when 
participants engage in communicative action oriented to understand the positions of others and 
building trust. (Driessen 2014:95)
That is, deliberation is not only about making (formal) decisions but arriving at some (informal) 
arrangement of mutual truth, consensus, or cohabitation. This can take place anywhere that 
humans and animals meet. These everyday situations enable us to build sympathetic relations 
with animals, which generate knowledge and ethical insights (Gunderson 2017). For example, in 
their analysis of “natural horsemanship,” Nora Schuurman and Alex Franklin (2015) illustrate 
how expertise is effectively co-constructed between human and equine participants. The trainer’s 
status as “expert” depends in large part on the counterperformance of the horse, and the way this 
is negotiated by both parties. Horses and people alike thereby become active participants in the 
communicative world around them: Or, as Latour (2007) says, “all the actors do something and 
don’t just sit there” (p. 128). New materialisms thus promise a radically different epistemological 
starting point for examining these relations, one that is nonhierarchical and accepts that “knowl-
edge is not abstract, rather it is embodied and enacted and emerges from the interactions of vari-
ous objects within networks” (Taylor 2011:217). In a later article, Schuurman and Franklin 
(2018) draw on John Law and Annemarie Mol’s (2002) notion of tinkering to describe these 
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individualized forms of embodied practice. Similarly, Steve Hinchliffe et al. (2005) describe this 
as a kind of fermentation or experimentation. Like Habermas, then, these writers prioritize the 
intersubjective relationships between actors. However, by extending their focus beyond the 
human, they show how animals, people, sites, and situations are affected by each other through 
their engagement in specific spaces and places. Through our emotional and psychological 
responses, we are engaged in a process of mutual becoming (Lorimer 2007; Thrift 2004), or a 
“collective endeavour” (Hinchliffe et al. 2005:652).
A colorful illustration is provided by the story of German gelding Clever Hans (Despret 2004). 
He became an equine celebrity and scientific curiosity in the early twentieth century, tapping out 
the answers to mathematical puzzles with his hoof. Extensive investigations revealed that Hans 
was “merely” responding to the body language of his questioners, who would unconsciously 
tense their muscles until he produced the correct answer. Although Hans could not count, he was 
doing something much more interesting: He was making human bodies be affected, even without 
their owners’ knowledge:
Who influences and who is influenced, in this story, are questions that can no longer receive a clear 
answer. Both, human and horse, are cause and effect of each other’s movements. Both induce and are 
induced, affect and are affected. (Despret 2004:115)
Learning how to address animals is not the result of scientific or theoretical understanding, it is 
the condition or starting point of this understanding (Despret 2004, 2013). More widely, it is out 
of these individualized forms of embodied practice, within complex and diverse sites and situa-
tions, that shared forms of life emerge (Haraway 2008; Law and Mol 2002). Only by taking risks 
and allowing animals and others “to object to the stories we tell about them, to intervene in our 
processes as much as we intervene in theirs . . . can we hope to learn how things matter to humans 
and nonhumans” (Hinchliffe et al. 2005:655–56).
To synthesize, Habermas offers an appealing framework through which we might chal-
lenge the marginalization of animals, but his narrow definition of language preemptively 
excludes them from his analysis. Together, political theory and new materialist perspectives 
enable us to extend to domestic animals Habermas’ emphasis on communication as a route to 
emancipation. Clemens Driessen (2014) suggests that communicative action emerges not 
only within institutionalized settings but also in the unremarkable, everyday deliberative 
encounters that unfold between people and animals. However, a new form of multispecies 
politics requires that we increase our receptivity (Dobson 2010): Rather than making animals 
speak, we should listen harder to what they already have to say. Together, via an extensive 
communicative repertoire, we can build trusting relations aimed at enabling consensus or 
cohabitation. It becomes clear that these interactions are material processes that depend upon 
context and entail embodiment, affect and experimentation on all sides (Argent 2012; Game 
2001). This relational approach differs from bargaining or negotiation in that “identities, 
ideas and desires are not static input to the process . . . but are themselves open for revision 
and at stake” (Driessen 2014:101). Horses, humans, and others attach and detach to different 
others, in what Joanna Latimer (2013) calls a process of “being alongside.” We might thereby 
redefine the very process of domestication as an emotional relationship, in which animal and 
human alike are effectively constructed by their mutual expectations of and faith in each other 
(Despret 2004, 2013a). Kendra Coulter (2016) is among those reflecting on the emancipatory 
potential of this kind of interspecies engagement: “someone does not need to be ‘the same’ as 
you in order for you to feel and foster solidarity” with them (p. 150). It is to this political 
project that we now turn.
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Transforming Human-Animal Relationships: How Critical 
Theory Promises an Alternative Political Imaginary
Critical Theory always has a goal in mind, namely that of emancipation. Habermas is clearly more 
optimistic about the potential for transforming industrial societies than Horkheimer and Adorno. He 
suggests that through rational and transparent dialogue we can build mutual understanding of what is 
and what ought to be. Hannah Arendt (1970) points out that communicative power is itself a form of 
solidarity: By engaging with one another in this way, individuals become aware of and consolidate 
co-membership in a collective form of life. Indeed, Habermas’ later work (e.g. 1996) focuses on how 
individual communicative encounters in turn might facilitate collective deliberation about what kind 
of world we want to live in. As discussed above, this work also raises the possibility of expanding this 
analysis to domestic animals. He recognizes them as vulnerable members of human society, with 
whom we should communicate in order to understand their interests (Gunderson 2017; Habermas 
1993). By bringing Critical Theory into conversation with wider political theory and new materialist 
perspectives, we have demonstrated that domestic animals participate in deliberative processes when 
given the opportunity to do so. Horses and others as engage in open dialogue with humans and others 
through embodied and affective forms of communication (Despret 2004, 2013a, 2013b). The consen-
sus and mutual understanding that can emerge from these trusting relations potentially enable us to 
challenge the marginalization of domestic animals within industrial society at both the individual and 
collective level. By extending Critical Theory in this way, we can potentially put forward alternative 
visions of what a “good life” might look like for humans, horses, and perhaps other animals too.
These visions will be multiple, but are likely to be based on appeals to greater justice and soli-
darity. For example, Coulter (2016) suggests that alienation and exploitation unfold across spe-
cies lines, with particular groups of animals and people harmed and oppressed by similar 
organizations, ideas, and processes. From riding school to racing stable, physical proximity, 
demanding conditions and the emotional bond that develops between horses and the humans who 
care for them—usually young, female, and/or migrant workers—results in their shared suffering 
(Miller 2013; Porcher 2011). Horses and human carers alike work hard from a young age and risk 
catastrophic injury. Adopting a bottom-up focus on species, as we might on gender or class, 
enables us to generate a “horse-story” to accompany that of a “her-story or a his-story” (Swart 
2007:154). In turning to the emancipatory potential of communicative approaches for both 
domestic animals and humans, however, we need to pay close attention to agency, place and 
power and the way they intersect for animals individually and collectively (Haraway 2008).
Both Habermas and new materialists (notably Latour) are reproached for downplaying relations 
of power and place. For example, those who appear to be sniping irrationally from the sidelines of 
a given Habermasian encounter may indeed be acting rationally, in refusing to engage with the 
power relations they detect (Russell and Montin 2015). New materialisms in turn deliberately 
remove the “‘hierarchical’ view that pervades social science thinking” by arguing that humans, 
animals, and objects are equally worthy of consideration (Taylor 2011:215). Power is not absent, 
but rests within the relations between agents rather than within the agents themselves (Latour 1988). 
As Alice Hovorka (2019) notes, “while we and others have always been networked . . . we and oth-
ers have also always been ordered” (p. 752). Hovorka adds that relational webs—whether human, 
nonhuman, or both—are characterized by hierarchies of position and connectivity. Nonetheless, 
critics suggest that this approach obscures the very existence of enduring structures and relations of 
power: “If we do not know which actors are more important than others then we deny ourselves the 
ability to intervene in the hope of altering the existing balance of forces” (Choat 2018:1036). While 
ANT is not a moral theory but an analytical approach, it can potentially enable sustained social and 
ethical critique by “unpacking that which has been simplified or buried” (Williams-Jones and 
Graham 2003:290; see also Cerulo 2009 and Taylor 2011). This confirms the usefulness of adopting 
a critical approach to new materialisms, as advocated throughout this paper. For example, Latimer 
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(2013) suggests that overlaying the “flat ontology” of such approaches with the “ethics of emanci-
pation” enables us to achieve a more stratified view of social reality that acknowledges the asym-
metrical relations between humans and domestic animals. Specifically, she characterizes those 
relations not as “being with” (Haraway 2008) but “being alongside.” As Helen Wilson (2017) sug-
gests, “encounter” is not an empty referent for any form of meeting, rather “encounters are meet-
ings where difference is somehow noteworthy” (p. 455). This enables us to sustain regard for both 
the connections and divisions that characterize human-nonhuman relations, avoiding the otherwise 
totalizing effect on our less powerful animal partners (Latimer 2013).
Thus, as we reflect on the potential of more deliberative approaches to give rise to a more inclu-
sive moral community, a more species-centric approach enables us to remember that “co-consti-
tuted relations may also be those of inequality and oppression” (Cudworth 2010:148). Horse-human 
relations illustrate this well. At the individual level, despite the mutual embodiment and affect 
outlined above, the human partner alone can break the relationship at any time by selling the horse 
to someone else (Birke and Thompson 2017). At the collective level, horses—like people—are 
subject to uneven social and economic outcomes (Hobson 2007). Recognizing them as political as 
well as social actors enables us to explore how people and horses, individually and collectively, 
might resist this exploitation and posit possible alternatives. As above, this requires focusing on 
agency as an outcome of specific relations, rather than a property in itself (Despret 2013a; Lemke 
2018). According to Jason Hribal, for example, individual animal subjects do not “suddenly and 
without much effort, become actors” (Hribal 2007:102). Rather, they enact their lives, engaging 
with the power structures around them just as people do. Hribal (2007) draws on James Scott’s 
(1987) notion of the “weapons of the weak” to describe how animals resist their own exploitation 
within these structures. These weapons are on display within the dusty, echoing confines of an 
indoor riding school on any given Saturday. Like his friends, Teddy is very effective at Scott’s 
(1987) first tactic of faking ignorance. Ignoring the polite leg behind the girth that asks for canter, 
Teddy instead trots faster and faster, hurtling inexorably around corners while his rider gamely 
hangs onto his mane. Likewise, Mary—a deceptively placid bay cob—is well known for taking 
breaks without permission. Toward the end of lessons, she sometimes turns in, drops to her knees, 
and rolls in the dust, barely leaving her flustered jockey time to jump clear. By focusing on the 
actual behavior of individuals and groups in this way, we begin to understand how animal practices 
are “wholly contextual and relational,” embedded within wider structures of power (Whatmore 
2002:34). However, more positively, in addition to becoming attuned to their resistance, we need to 
open up “spaces in which [horses and others] can communicate what kind of world they would like 
to co-create for themselves, with humans” (Birke and Thompson 2017:136). A new materialist 
perspective, then, enables us to focus on how horses and others communicate and enact these 
wishes. Humans and nonhumans alike are enacted and enacting through what Vinciane Despret 
(2013b) calls their “embodied choreography,” which in turn “blurs the clear-cut divide between 
knowing subject and known object” (p. 69; see also Despret 2013a and Fudge 2017).
To summarize, together Critical Theory and new materialisms build our understanding of what 
a “good life” might look like for humans, horses and perhaps other animals too. Critical Theory 
points us toward a more emancipated future, while a new materialist perspective suggests progress 
toward it is likely to be slow and messy, coming about through complex, mundane, and material 
practices (Law and Mol 2002; Schuurman and Franklin 2018). As elsewhere in the article, horse-
human relationships illustrate and extend the analysis. In this case, they suggest that while we need 
to acknowledge the relations of power within deliberative encounters between humans and horses 
(and perhaps other animals), they are not necessarily fatal to our aspirations and the means by 
which we seek to attain them. Despret’s (2004) retelling of the story of Clever Hans and Schuurman 
and Franklin’s (2015) insights into the world of natural horsemanship demonstrate that knowledge 
is “distributed.” That is, knowledge comes about through the way in which animals and people are 
“attuned” to each other: “Both are active and both are transformed by the availability of the other” 
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(Despret 2004:125). Donna Landry (2011) suggests that these micro-level processes have a 
broader impact. She traces how a sense of mutual responsibility and service persist in horse-
human relations despite disparities of power. Turning to the distant past of the Ottoman Empire for 
her analysis, she suggests that among the Sultan’s equine and human subjects alike, there was a 
“dignity in service and in serving willingly” (Landry 2011:19). That is, human-nonhuman rela-
tions might be simultaneously hierarchical and ethical. Even within relations of power, then, “jus-
tice, fair treatment, and respect for others” are possible (Patton 2003:95). In this sense, bringing 
together Critical Theory and new materialisms with a focus on horse-human relations enriches 
both our understanding of oppression and our visions(s) of an alternative future.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to respond simultaneously to calls to take the animal question more 
seriously (Gunderson 2014) and to adopt a more critical approach to human and nonhuman agency 
more widely (Arboleda 2017; Lemke 2018). Specifically, it has shown how the ideas of Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Habermas illuminate and challenge the marginalization of domestic animals in rich 
countries and help us imagine a broader more inclusive moral community for the future. In so 
doing, the article has explored how human and nonhuman agencies at the micro level intersect 
with wider relations of place and power. The focus on our entangled relationships with domestic 
animals enables us to understand how the individual and collective agency of one particular group 
of nonhuman actors—horses—is constrained within particular spaces and industrial society as a 
whole and how this might be challenged.
In this way, the article has made two theoretical contributions. First, it has extended new mate-
rialist discussions about nonhuman agency by using Critical Theory to show how deliberative 
relationships both embody domestic animals and those with whom they engage and embed them 
within wider socio-economic relations. This raises the need for further empirical research that 
places those nonhuman actors themselves and their points-of-view at the center, perhaps via 
advances in visual ethnography, multispecies ethnography, or ethology. Second, by focusing on 
domestic animals in particular, the article has theoretically integrated nonhumans into Critical 
Theory, thereby helping to paint a clearer picture of society as multispecies. In so doing, the article 
takes a step toward the radical “new” politics promised by new materialisms by recognizing and 
accepting the important human affinities with nonhuman others that help make us who we are. As 
Taylor (2011) suggests, we cannot just apply new materialisms “like a new layer, on top of tradi-
tional analyses” (p. 215). Rather we need to start from a fundamentally different point, one that 
focuses on the processes of relating rather than on those who do the relating. For example, we 
might usefully explore the way in which knowledge and understanding is distributed between 
humans and nonhumans not only within individual encounters but more widely. Such research 
would offer insight into the way in which this “new” politics plays out on the ground.
Throughout the article, then, I have tried to retain a critical perspective that also brings a reassur-
ing tangibility to our understanding of both new materialisms and Critical Theory. That is, in turn-
ing and returning to our relations with domestic animals in particular, I hope to have furthered our 
understanding of what Horkheimer (1933) calls “the unity between us and them” (p. 36)
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